



Corporate Disclosures on Curbing Bribery and the UK Bribery 
Act 2010: Evidence from UK companies  
 
Muhammad Azizul Islam1 
Professor in Accountancy  
University of Aberdeen 
Email: azizul.islam@abdn.ac.uk 
 
Shamima Haque  
Senior Lecturer in Accounting  
University of Aberdeen 
Email: shamima.haque@abdn.ac.uk 
 
Sharon Henderson  
Manager, Financial Advisory - Infrastructure 




Professor of Accounting  





Sessional Academic  
UQ Business School  
Email:  h.semeen@uq.edu.au 
 
Citation: Islam, M. A., Haque, S., Henderson, S., Jones, M. and Semeen, H. (Accepted), Corporate 
disclosures on curbing bribery and the UK Bribery Act 2010: evidence from UK companies,  
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal  
Acknowledgements: We are pleased to acknowledge the helpful and stimulating responses from colleagues 
(including Professor Rob Gray) at the CSEAR Conference in St Andrews, August 26-28, 2014.  
 
1 Corresponding Author  
2 
 
Corporate Disclosures on Curbing Bribery and the UK Bribery 
Act 2010: Evidence from UK companies  
 
Abstract  
Purpose –This study aims to investigate whether United Kingdom (UK)-based companies have 
changed their voluntary disclosures on curbing the bribery of foreign officials in response to the UK 
Bribery Act 2010, if so whether and how such disclosure changes substantively reflected allegations 
of bribery of foreign officials by news media. 
Design/methodology/approach:  By using the notions of institutional pressure and decoupling and 
applying content and thematic analysis we examined, in particular, disclosures on curbing bribery by 
the largest 100 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange in periods before and after the 
Bribery Act (2007–2012). News media reports covering incidents of bribery of foreign officials and 
related corporate disclosures before and after the Act were thoroughly examined to problematise 
corporate anti-bribery disclosure practices.  
Findings: Our study finds a significant change in disclosure on curbing bribery before and after the 
enactment of the UK Bribery Act, consistent with the notion of institutional coercive pressure. 
However, decoupling is also found: organisations’ disclosures did not substantively reflect incidents 
of bribing foreign public officials, mostly from underprivileged developing nations.  
Research limitations/implications: This study acknowledges a limitation stemming from using 
media reports that focus on bribery incidents in identifying actual cases or incidents of bribery. As 
some of the incidents identified from news media reports appeared to be allegations, not convictions 
for bribery, companies could have defensible reasons for not disclosing some aspects of them. 
Originality/Value: This study contributes to the accounting literature by problematising MNCs’ 
operations in underprivileged countries. Our findings suggest that not only public officials in 
developing countries as creators of bribery but also western-based MNCs as the suppliers of bribery, 
contribute to perpetuating unethical practices and injustices to the under-privileged communities in 
developing countries. Our research is imperative as this is one of the first known studies that provide 
evidence of the actions including disclosure related actions companies have taken in response to the 








Corporate bribery as an emerging issue is present in many countries (see, for example, Jones 
2011) and has received ubiquitous stakeholder concern, but little is known about whether and 
how multinational companies (MNCs) adopt measures including disclosure on combatting 
bribery of foreign officials. Extant research has so far provided little or no insights into how 
disclosures in relation to MNC’s anti-bribery measures in a particular regulatory context can 
be problematic. Accordingly, we aim to provide critical analysis of disclosures on curbing 
bribery of foreign officials by UK (United Kingdom) based MNCs which are subject to the UK 
Bribery Act 2010. To achieve our research aim, we investigate whether and how United 
Kingdom (UK)-based MNCs have changed their disclosures on curbing bribery in response to 
the UK Bribery Act 2010, and whether and how such disclosure changes reflect media 
allegations of bribery of foreign officials. In other words, we investigate how coercive 
pressures2, usually imposed by governments, in this case, being the UK Bribery Act 2010 
influence anti-bribery disclosure provided by UK based companies. Our aim is aligned with 
prior social science research (see for example, Larrinaga, Carrasco, Correa, Llena, & Moneva, 
2002; Frost, 2007 within accounting literature; Shamir, 2004; Banks, 2019; Lord & Levi, 2018 
within law or regulation literature; Near & Dworkin, 1998; Weber & Wasieleski, 2013 within 
business ethics literature) that investigated corporate responsiveness to particular regulations 
or Acts.  
Wider social science literature focussing on corruption and bribery has rich and critical insights 
into how corruption/bribery narratives are linked to the post-colonial imperialism by developed 
nations and their patron-based supranational institutions (such as World Bank, IFC) who 
usually shape or paint developing nations in a broad-brush way as corrupt (Alemazung, 2010; 
De Maria, 2008; Fraser-Moleketi, 2007; Rossini, 2017; Pierce, 2006; Everett,  Neu,  and 
Rahaman, 2007; Sikka, 2003). Such literature within the interdisciplinary accounting field (see 
Sikka, 2003; Everett et al. 2007) highlights that while many consider that developing countries 
are often painted as more corrupt than developed ones, arguably such consideration is one-
sided and does not reflect the real incidents in developing nations. More importantly, little 
attention is paid to the role of developed nations and their MNCs as front runners in supplying 
bribery. In fact, the orthodox or conventional view frames developing nations as the creators 
of bribery which often does not reflect reality. Whereas, a closer look at the incidents of bribery 
of foreign officials indicates responsibility avoidance from the suppliers of bribery (such as 
MNCs) located in the developed parts of the world. Therefore, instead of focussing on 
developing nations, we focus on MNCs based in a developed country, the UK, where a unique 
bribery Act namely the UK Bribery Act 2010 has been enacted to eliminate all kinds of bribery. 
Our aim is to problematize MNCs’ operations in other countries (including developing nations) 
and its relation to the enactment of the UK Bribery Act. We pursue such an aim by investigating 
how the UK based MNCs disclose measures to curb the bribery of foreign public officials 
(mostly from underprivileged developing nations). 
 
2 The term coercive pressure is used in institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) refers to a pressure usually 
imposed by government requiring companies voluntarily or mandatorily to pursue specific behaviour including 




Bribing foreign officials to obtain an advantage in business decisions is a serious problem that 
not only threatens social, political and economic structures, especially those of developing 
nations, but also adversely affects companies involved in international commerce. Bribery of 
this nature undermines democracy and threaten economic progress (Venard & Hanafi, 2008; 
Ministry of Justice, 2011). The World Bank (2013, Para. 6) estimates that bribery of foreign 
officials costs US$1000 billion every year. This estimate includes all forms of bribery between 
MNCs and foreign public officials (World Bank, 2013, para. 11). This has serious implications 
for underprivileged developing nations because MNCs’ bribery of government officials in 
many developing nations is harming development and poverty elimination in those countries. 
However, unfortunately, until recently, the issue has not been recognised as a stand-alone 
societal and regulatory concern. Thus, the introduction of the UK Bribery Act and stronger 
ongoing stakeholder attention to MNC’s global bribery appears to have implications for UK 
based MNCs and presents a unique research opportunity. It is therefore imperative to see 
whether and how MNCs responded to the expectations of the UK Bribery Act. 
 The enforcer of the UK Bribery Act, the Senior Fraud Office (SFO) has made an option of 
lenient punishment3 for those companies which self-report (i.e., voluntarily disclose) incidents 
of bribery in relation to foreign officials (SFO, 2012). We, therefore, focus on disclosures on 
combatting bribery of foreign officials by MNCs. Prior research has documented a range of 
potential reasons for social and environmental disclosures (see reviews within Parker, 2005; 
Deegan, 2002; Dumay, De Villiers, Guthrie, & Hsiao, 2018), and at the same time, a growing 
amount of research has highlighted a problematic aspect of such practices (see, for example, 
Islam, Deegan and Gray, 2018; Chwastiak & Young, 2003; Puxty, 1991). While it is evident 
that companies (such as MNCs) operating in different industries and different regions require 
more disclosures because their activities are of keen current interest, such as environmentally 
unfriendly activities, socially irresponsible actions, new technology industries, and so on, such 
practices can be problematic because these may not create accountability to the broader 
community (see related research that documented problematic aspects of social 
and/environmental disclosures or social audits, Islam, Deegan and Haque, 2020; Islam, Gray 
and Deegan, 2018; Semeen and Islam, 2020; Gray, 2010). Given the widespread stakeholder 
concerns on specific social accountability issues such as bribery, it is essential to investigate 
MNCs’ disclosures on combatting bribery of foreign officials and explore a problematic aspect 
of the practices that may not create accountability to the broader community (including local 
communities in developing countries affected by the bribery of officials)4. 
  
 
3 i.e. a provision for civil conviction instead of criminal prosecution. 
4 While many studies have examined the content and implications of the UK Bribery Act on internal actors within 
the organisations such as employees and how this Act may differ from other anti-bribery laws (Kirk, 2011; Dunst, 
Diamant, & Kung, 2011; Yeoh, 2012a; 2012b; Lord, 2016), this study is unique in its focus on how corporations 
respond. There is also a need to investigate bribery of foreign officials a type of corruption because, in light of 




In line with critical accounting literature (Islam, Deegan, & Gray, 2018; Islam, Deegan & 
Haque, 2020; Semeen & Islam, 2020; Gallhofer & Haslam, 1997; Gray, 2010; Sikka,  2011; 
Chwastiak & Young, 2003; Martinez & Cooper, 2017; Neu, Cooper, & Everett, 2001; Puxty, 
1991) and by drawing on the notions of coercive pressures (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Scott, 
1995) and decoupling (Sandholz 2012; Lepoutre & Valente, 2012), we investigate the impact 
of the UK Bribery Act on disclosures and show insights into how such institutional requirement 
for disclosures of particular bribery incidents can be problematic. Accordingly, an analysis of 
corporate reports [annual reports and CSR reports] by the Top 100 London Stock Exchange-
listed companies (subject to the UK Bribery Act 2010) from 2009-2012 and an in-depth 
examination of news media articles during both pre and post regulatory periods concerning 
these companies was conducted. Accordingly, in line with the notion of coercive pressure5 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995), we found corporations’ disclosures on curbing 
bribery significantly increased from 2009 to 2012 and responded to coercive regulatory 
pressure for self-regulating. Based on the concept of decoupling, (i.e., the difference between 
actions and disclosures (Lepoutre & Valente, 2012; Sandholtz, 2012), we found that 
organisations’ disclosures did not substantively reflect the incidents of bribery of foreign 
officials. There was a mismatch between organisational disclosures and incidents of bribery of 
foreign public officials and a variation in an organisation’s level of disclosure and the degree 
of decoupling and/or institutional non-conformity was evident. Such finding suggests that 
companies’ anti-bribery disclosure provide only symbolic aspects of an institutional logic and 
not material expectations in conformance with the UK Bribery Act. Thus, our study contributes 
to the accounting literature by problematizing MNCs’ operations in underprivileged countries. 
Our findings suggest that western-based MNCs as the suppliers of bribery, contribute to 
perpetuating unethical practices and injustices to the underprivileged communities in 
developing countries.  
The remainder of this paper has six sections.  Section 2 provides the background of the bribery 
of foreign officials and stakeholder concern as well as the requirements and uniqueness of the 
UK Bribery Act 2010. Section 3, the theoretical framework provides an overview of the notions 
of coercive pressure and decoupling. Section 4 outlines the research methods of this study. 
Section 5 describes the results in relation to the research questions. Section 6 provides a 
conclusion.    
 
2. Bribery of foreign Public officials, Stakeholder Concerns and the UK 
Bribery Act 2010: Background 
Business activity on a global scale is at the forefront of many MNCs’ agendas (Lord, 2016). 
Often, third party representatives, agents and intermediaries in overseas jurisdictions are used 
to bribe officials to win or maintain contracts with foreign governments (Sung, 2005; Cleveland 
et al., 2009). Over many years, researchers have documented the fragile and underdeveloped 
democratic institutions and market structures within developing nations. They have argued that 
 
5 Notion of coercive isomorphism suggests that organisations will conform to the demands of regulation to 
attain and maintain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
6 
 
such situations encourage corrupt behaviour (Meny, 1996; Williams & Beare, 1999; Adeyeye, 
2012 p.70). It is widely accepted that cross-border bribery is prevalent in developing nations 
in which local anti-bribery regulation holds little to no power over big MNCs (Sanyal, 2012).  
MNCs experience a globalised, connected and intertwining network of operations that makes 
them increasingly susceptible to organised bribery. In such an environment, corporations are 
faced with the hard challenge of implementing and monitoring effective anti-bribery measures 
(Baughn, Bodie, Buchanan & Bixby, 2010). Governments of many developed nations appear 
either reluctant or face difficulties in regulating multinational transactions which in many cases 
are susceptible to corruption. At the same time, developing nations are likely to suffer more 
from the impacts of corruption because they simply do not have enough resources as developed 
nations. Given that,  broader stakeholder groups, orthodox Inter-Governmental Organisations 
(IGOs) including OECD and global Non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) including 
Transparency International (TI), are concerned over the MNCs’ overseas conducts (Lord, 2016; 
Carr & Outhwaite, 2011). News media also plays an essential role in generating worldwide 
concern over the global bribery by MNCs (Stapenhurst, 2000, p.3; Welford, Chan & Man, 
2007).  
As a response to broader stakeholder concerns about anti-bribery laws in the UK, the UK 
Bribery Act received Royal Assent in April 2010 and came into force on 1 July 2011 (Ministry 
of Justice, 2011). Previous foreign bribery legislation in the UK, such as the Public Bodies 
Corrupt Practices Act 1889 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, were deemed 
inappropriate for a  nation operating in the global economy (Ministry of Justice, 2011). As the 
prominence of cross-border bribery increases in society, so do regulations attempting to control 
it (TI, 2010). The UK Bribery Act 2010 represents an important part of OECD treaty 
harmonization. The Act is built on the 1977 Financial Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the 
USA. Being recognised as the “toughest anti-corruption legislation in the world” (Russell, 2011 
p. 1), the UK Bribery Act criminalises the promising or giving of financial or other advantages 
to a foreign public official in order to achieve a business advantage, and also provides 
jurisdiction over cross-border bribery activity/ies committed by any corporation with 
operations in the UK (Ministry of Justice, 2011). From this perspective, the UK Bribery Act 
resembles the FCPA.  
 The UK Bribery Act is “an Act to make provision about offences relating to bribery; and for 
connected purposes” (c.23 p. 1). Its objective is to be a robust mechanism for curbing 
corporations’ cross-border or overseas bribery (Ministry of Justice, 2011). While each part of 
the UK has its prosecution agencies, the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is the lead agency for 
enforcing the Act. The SFO holds the jurisdiction of investigating and prosecuting corporate 
offences of fraud and bribery. Under Sections 1 and 2 of the Act, two general provisions — the 
“active” and “passive” bribery clauses — are given. The former pertains to the offering, 
promising or giving of an advantage to obtain or retain business; whilst the latter refers to 
requesting, agreeing to receive or accepting an advantage in order to obtain or retain business 
(s.1, s.2). Aligned with the amended US FCPA (1998) and OECD convention, the UK Bribery 
Act aims to force organisations to assess the adequacy of their existing anti-bribery 
programmes. This law contains the first distinct provision for organisations that fail to prevent 
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bribery. Section 7 (1) stipulates that organisations subject to the Bribery Act are liable if they 
fail to prevent persons associated with them from committing bribery on their behalf. This 
thereby requires companies to take adequate measures to control bribery-related activity in 
their organisations (s.7.1). The Act also allows corporations to demonstrate adequate anti-
bribery procedures as a mitigating circumstance (s.7.2; Yeoh, 2012a). The boundaries of the 
Act extend beyond residents of the UK and organisations incorporated in the UK. As stated in 
Section 12(5), any organisation that does business in the UK is subject to the Act. Besides, 
organisations are liable even if a person associated with the company commits bribery, 
meaning that contractors, suppliers, agents, intermediaries and anyone acting on behalf of the 
company is subject to the Act (Ministry of Justice, 2011). However, the Act is not problem-
free. In particular, right after its enactment, its provision for mitigating circumstance sparked 
major controversy and generated public debates (Milford, 2013). 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
 We draw on the notions of coercive pressure (Scott, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell’s 1983) and 
organisational decoupling (Lepoutre & Valente, 2012; Sandholtz, 2012), to explain the impact 
of the British Bribery Act on disclosures and offer critical insights into how such institutional 
requirement can be problematic. While accounting literature focusses on a wide range of 
critical theories ranging from Marxist informed perspectives to Bourdieusian notions (Semeen 
& Islam, 2020; Gallhofer & Haslam, 1997; Chwastiak & Young, 2003; Neu, Cooper, & 
Everett, 2001; Puxty, 1991) to explain particular disclosure or non-disclosures, our research 
contributes to the literature by considering the use of institutional turning of critique6 to explain 
such practices.  
The notion of coercive pressure indicates that regulations influence organisational practices 
(see, Scott, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Recent accounting research (for example, 
Reichborn-Kjennerud, González-Díaz, Bracci, Carrington, Hathaway, Jeppesen, & Steccolini, 
2019) has considered the notion of coercive pressure (Scott, 1995) in explaining the regulatory 
role of a public sector accounting or audit institution’s role to fight corruption. Accordingly, 
we expect that regulatory pressure such as UK bribery legislation has implications for 
corporations. The UK government appears to institutionalise external coercive pressure via a 
shift in bribery regulation, creating strong demand for corporations to conform to the 
expectations of governments, NGOs and IGOs. Therefore, it is important to understand whether 
and how the coercive pressure of the UK Bribery Act influences corporate disclosures on 
combatting bribery of foreign officials.   
Reichborn-Kjennerud et al. (2019) used Scott’s (1995) notion of coercive pressure to explain 
corruption control measures in the public sector. We find such a notion relevant to explain 
 
6 There is a debate over whether institutional theory has enough insight to be critical (see the discussion between 
Willmott, 2015 and Lok, 2019). We agree with Lok’s (2019) discussion that suggests that institutional theory has 
critical potential, and institutional theorists who are embarking on the recent critical turn can make important 




bribery-related disclosures by MNCs. While we start with a discussion on the notion of 
coercive pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, Scott, 1995), our study is data-driven and mostly 
relies on another institutional notion, decoupling (Souitaris, Zerbinati, & Liu, 2012; Lepoutre 
& Valente, 2012; Sandholtz 2012). The notion of decoupling is helpful to investigate whether 
the change in corporate disclosures on curbing the bribery of foreign officials, created by 
regulatory or coercive pressure, substantively reflects real allegations of bribery. Decoupling 
is the process through which organisations closely conform to the expectations of the 
environment where it operates, without any intention of implementing those expectations at 
the operational level (Pache & Santos, 2013). Decoupling occurs when there is a mismatch 
between formal organisational practices (disclosures) and actual organisational actions (real 
events). While organisations may formally make disclosures that display conformity to 
institutional expectations, organisations may also decouple such disclosures from their actual 
actions (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; George et al., 2006).  
Given the widespread investigation of decoupling as well as the variation of institutional 
conformity or even non-conformity (Helms, Oliver & Webb, 2012; Souitaris et al.,  2012; 
Lepoutre & Valente, 2012; Hengal et al, 2014; Fiss & Zajac, 2006), by relying on Sandholtz 
(2012), we focus on the varying degrees of decoupling: full decoupling, slight decoupling and 
no coupling (see Table, 1). In studying the decoupling processes within organisational 
responses to ISO 9000 certification standards, Sandoltz (2012) identified two different types 
of decoupling: malignant (resulting from strong organisational opposition to regulation) and 
benign (reflecting implementation of regulation).  
We apply the different degrees of decoupling, as suggested by Sandholtz (2012) to different 
nature and extent of disclosures on combatting bribery. Prior literature indicates that 
corporations remain silent (Buhr, 2001) to negate the relationship with the stakeholders, or to 
provide vague, strategic response. Such negation serves as carriers of the institutional pressure 
(Lepoutre & Valente, 2012), and demonstrates corporations’ symbolic adaption as well as 
(Jamali, 2010; Holder-Webb & Cohen, 201). Merging the propositions of different level of 
decoupling (Sandholtz, 2012) and different natures and extents of particular CSR disclosures 
(Buhr, 2001; Jamali, 2010; Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2012) we expect that three degrees of 
decoupling can range from: 
• Malignant separation: an extreme form of institutional decoupling. For example, the 
complete non-disclosure of bribery-related events. 
• Symbolic adoption: some disclosure of bribery-related events but inconsistent with 
formal requirements of regulations.  For example, ceremonial or ritualistic disclosures.  
• Complete implementation: where organisations are found entirely compliant.  For 









Table 1: Three Degrees of Decoupling: strategy and nature of the disclosure 
Degree of Decoupling Decoupling Strategy Nature of Disclosure 
Full decoupling 
 
Malignant separation Non-disclosure, separation 
Slight decoupling Symbolic adoption Ceremonial, ritualistic, generic, 
presentation but not substantial 
No decoupling Complete implementation Substantive, detailed, full disclosure 
 
 
Using the categorisation mentioned in the above table (Table 1), our study examined whether 
and how disclosures reflect real bribery incidents reported by the news media. Accordingly, 
such an examination will help us to provide critical insights into corporate disclosures on 
bribery. The notion of decoupling has remained unaddressed in accounting literature (see 
MacLean & Behnam, 2010 for insight into the problematic aspects of decoupling within 
management literature) and in particular, the examination disclosures via different degrees of 
decoupling deserve research attention. In other words, while existing research highlighted the 
problematic aspect of disclosure/non-disclosures (see for example, Semeen & Islam, 2020; 
Chwastiak & Young, 2003), institutional requirements or regulation was not the direct focus 
of such critical research.  
While regulation may be a mechanism ensuring decoupling minimisation, conformity to 
regulations of a ceremonial or a symbolic nature may render a form of institutional ‘immunity’ 
to the regulatory pressures. From the institutional immunity perspective, Lepoutre and 
Valente’s (2012) work is relevant here.  Under some conditions or contradictory situations, 
organisational actors may adopt decoupling strategies (malignant separation or symbolic 
adoption, Table 1) to immunise themselves under the pressures for conformity to prevailing 
logic (Lepoutre and Valente, 2012). The apparent motivation for an organisational actor to seek 
immunity from an institutional requirement depends on its key actors’ (managers’) desire to 
maximise self-interests from conforming to that institutional requirement (Lepoutre & Valente, 
2012; George et al., 2006). Accordingly, in an attempt to establish the problems presented by 
organisational decoupling and the processes of seeking immunity and maximising self-interest, 









4.  Research Methods 
We commence with content analysis to document the level of disclosures on combatting 
bribery as a response to coercive pressure (the UK bribery Act). We then use thematic analysis 
to critically analyse organisational decoupling with reference to a specific item of disclosures, 
this being disclosure of bribery of foreign officials by MNCs. A brief discussion of content 
analysis and thematic analysis is next.  
4.1. Content analysis 
This study uses content analysis, a commonly used method in accounting research (Beattie, 
2014). Unlike prior studies which have used only a single type of content analysis, two specific 
types were used in this instance: first, a simple presence/absence index analysis where the items 
to be studied are specified ex-ante; and second, a thematic content analysis where the whole 
text on a particular topic (see, Beattie & Thomson, 2007) or specific incidents were analysed 
(see a general overview of methods within Beattie et al., 2004). Considering the two different 
types of content analysis, we analyse corporate media, including annual reports and CSR 
reports, to determine whether and how corporate disclosures on curbing bribery of foreign 
officials have or have not changed over the enactment period of the UK Bribery Act. We then 
consider news media articles about incidents of bribery of foreign officials concerning 
corporations that come under the jurisdiction of the UK Bribery Act to determine the nature of 
disclosures and degrees of decoupling.  
Annual reports and CSR reports of the companies listed on the Top 100 London Stock 
Exchange on 30 June 2013 were selected for the presence/absence index analysis. The period 
from 2009 to 2012 was chosen in order to identify any shifts in disclosures from before, during 
and after legal enforcement of the UK Bribery Act 2010. There are no specific guidelines for 
choosing the number of years before and after the emergence of regulation to examine its 
impact. However, our decision of choosing two years of disclosure before the enactment of the 
Act and two years of disclosures after the Act is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Frost, 
2007). We analysed 396 annual reports from 99 companies and 364 CSR reports from 91 
companies. A company was excluded from the final sample if it was newly incorporated during 
the sample period. Eight companies without CSR reports for any of the sample years were also 
excluded from the final CSR report sample.  
The annual reports and CSR reports were analysed by developing a presence/absence 
disclosure index consistent with the prior research (e.g., Islam & McPhail, 2011). Our 
disclosure index was primarily based on the UK’s Adequate Procedures Guidance (APG) 
which is in line with the UK Bribery Act 2010 (Ministry of Justice, 2011). The disclosure index 
is a composition of the following four general themes based on the UK’s APG:  
• Top management and human resource policy and procedures 
• Risk Assessment ; 
• Due Diligence Measures to curb different nature of bribery of foreign public officials  
• Monitoring and Review of Bribery of foreign public officials  
These four general themes regarding companies’ fight to curb bribery were chosen in order to 
reflect the principles detailed in the UK Bribery Act’s APG (See appendix A for a summary 
description of the six principles of APG as stated by the Ministry of Justice). However, 38 
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specific disclosure items (which APG does not specifically address) under the four general 
themes were developed by a review of two additional international guidelines including OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises-Section VI: Combating Bribery (OECD, 2009, 1998) and TI 
UK Bribery Act Adequate Procedures Checklist: guidance on good practices procedures for corporate 
anti-bribery programs (Wilkinson, 2010).  
 
All of the three guidelines (UK APG, TI Adequate Procedures Checklist and OECD 
Guidelines) suggest proper and practical anti-bribery guidance for UK Bribery. The UK APG 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011) assists companies in constituting what the UK Bribery Act refers to 
as “adequate procedures”. Section 7(2) of the UK Bribery Act (2010, c.23, p. 5) states: 
 
[…] it is a defence for a commercial organisation to prove that it had in place adequate 
procedures designed to prevent persons associated with the commercial organisation from 
undertaking bribery-related conduct. 
The TI Adequate Procedures Checklist and OECD guidelines definitively categorise specific 
operational policies and procedures. The UK APG observes considerable overlap with the TI 
Adequate Procedures Checklist and OECD guidelines. A disclosure index, in particular, is 
considered to be a practical and valid research tool when the selection of the items are based 
on other indices in the literature or international benchmarks. It is for this reason that we have 
merged these three guidance documents to develop a disclosure index to measure corporations’ 
disclosures on curbing bribery of foreign officials. As the enforcing agency, SFO considers 
disclosures of bribery-related allegations as lenient; we use these three guidelines to develop a 
disclosure index.  
 
The final content analysis disclosure index comprises four general categories (i.e., based on 
four general themes on the UK’s APG mentioned above) and 38 specific disclosure items. 
Scored against 396 annual reports and 364 CSR reports, a total of 47,880 individual 
observations for the content analysis of corporate media were observed. We used specific 
keywords to support our individual observations, and the keywords included, but were not 
limited to: “accounting”, “assessment”, “audit”, “board”, “bribe”, “bribery”, “corruption”, 
“commitment”, “compliance”,  “control”, “developing”, “employee”,   “foreign”, “fraud”,   
“human”, “internal”, “monitor”, “measure”, “official”, “resource”, “risk”, and  “training”,   
We used a presence/absence content analysis tool to analyse the content within corporations’ 
annual and CSR reports (Islam and McPhail, 2011 Beattie & Thomson, 2007).  We believe that 
a simple presence/absence tool can capture the quality and degree of specificity and 
completeness of disclosures better than other approaches which use a weighting scheme (see 
examples of weighting schemes within Hooks & van Staden, 2011). Where pieces of 
information relating to the same items are duplicated or repeated during the disclosure process, 
we counted them only once (as is consistent with the approach of Guthrie and Petty (2000). 
We endeavoured to understand organisational response through the changing level of anti-
bribery disclosures from the pre to the post-enactment period of the UK Bribery Act. At the 
same time, through thematic analysis (see next) we addressed the proposition that as 
institutional practices are complex and often symbolic in nature (Lepoutre & Valente, 2012; 
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Sandholtz, 2012; Buhr, 2001; Jamali, 2010; Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2012), anti-bribery 
disclosures by MNCs may be decoupled from their actual actions to eliminate bribery.  
 
4.2. Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis was the second type of analysis to be used in this study (i.e. Thematic 
analysis within Beattie &Thomson, 2007; Beattie et al., 2004). The thematic analysis was 
applied to news media articles as well and corporate reports in order to identify narratives of 
particular bribery incidents involving our sample companies. News media plays an important 
role in public policy and receives special attention for its political, cultural, social and economic 
influence (Fico, Lacy & Riffe, 2008). News media is an unobtrusive means7 of analysing 
interactions that occur in society and is therefore used in this study to examine allegations of 
bribery of foreign public officials.  
A thematic analysis focusing on particular cases of bribery incidents reported by news media 
was used to examine different levels of organisational decoupling as a response to coercive 
institutional pressures. Hartz & Steger (2010) used news media thematic analysis of German 
newspapers in order to explore the changing nature of organisations and their managers in 
relation to corporate governance. Likewise, Fiss & Hirsch (2005) also used news media texts 
analysis of newspaper articles from the US to analyse public discourse on globalisation. Our 
preferred method of thematic analysis is similar to that used by Hartz & Steger (2010) and Fiss 
& Hirsch (2005). 
For our thematic analysis, we followed three specific steps: 
• First, using the Dow Jones FACTIVA database, we extracted all news media articles 
that contained the word “bribery” or “corruption” for each of the sample companies. 
We reviewed the following leading global news media including (but not limited to) 
BBC, Financial Times, The Australian Financial Review, The Daily Telegraph, The 
Guardian, The International Herald Tribune, The Irish Times, The New York Times, 
The Sun, The Sunday Times, The Sydney Morning, The Times, The Wall Street Journal 
(USA, Europe and Asia), The Washington Post, USA Today, and presses including 
Agence France Presse, Dow Jones International News, and Reuters News. Duplicates 
of media articles published in the above-mentioned journals were removed so as not to 
distort the sample dataset. Covering the period from July 2011 to December 2012, the 
final data set contained 787 documents, 666 of which specifically related to bribery of 
foreign officials, while the other 121 related to other general forms of bribery and 
corruption issues such as tax avoidance or money laundering. The illustrative media 
articles covering the pre-regulation period (2007-2009) were also reviewed 
• Second, by reading each of the 666 news articles during 2011-2012, we identified 19 
incidents of bribery, involving 17 companies within our sample group. For the pre-
 
7 Unobtrusive means is something which cannot be observed directly and we need media’s assistance to observe 
this. Inflation is a classic example of obtrusive means, people can sense this through their daily economic activity.  
On the other hand, bribery is an example of unobtrusive means because people need a media to tell the story.   
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regulation period (2007-2009), we identified 8 incidents involving 7 of these 
companies.  
• Third, all of the relevant text within the corporate reporting media (i.e., annual reports, 
CSR reports and corporate websites) by a total of 17 companies (with the 27 bribery 
incidents in total over 2007-2009) was thoroughly read and analysed. We compared 
what the media reported and what companies disclosed. We looked at how our sample 
companies disclosed incidents of bribery due to coercive pressure (regulatory pressure) 
after the introduction of the UK Bribery Act (2011-2012) and at the same time we 
checked how these companies disclosed bribery incidents during the pre-regulation 
period (2007-2009). Such a comparison of the extent of decoupling between post and 
pre-regulatory periods appeared helpful to understand whether the Act was effective in 
reducing decoupling behaviour. In other words, we had the case-specific or illustrative 
understanding of whether decoupling was less or extensive after the introduction of the 
UK Bribery Act than before (that is, unregulated or non-coercive environment). For 
further analysis, subsequent or final media articles on the specific bribery 
cases/incidents after the Act came into force (from 2013 to 2018 — until the news 
media stopped reporting the cases) and relevant corporate annual reports were 
reviewed. With confidentiality in mind, all the companies identified as having bribery 
incidents are referred to by a coded number (please see Appendix, B). The order of the 
coded number does not reflect the order in which they appear above. 
In addition to the news media analysis, this study triangulated the preliminary findings with 
the evaluation reports of the OECD, intending to gain a more in-depth understanding of the 
nature of decoupling. The following section discusses the results of the study.  
 
 
5. Results  
 
5.1 Disclosure on curbing bribery and coercive pressures: Pre- and Post-implementation 
of the UK Bribery Act 2010 
Table 2 provides disclosures by UK based MNCs on curbing bribery from 2009-2012 in their 
annual reports (AR) and corporate sustainability reports (CSR) under the four categories 
including Top Management and Human Resource Policy and Procedures, Risk Assessment, 
Due Diligence Measures to Curb Different Nature of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and 
Monitoring and Review of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. Table 3 shows changes in the 
number of disclosures during the period from 2009 to 2012. As shown in table 2 and 3, the 
number of disclosures on curbing bribery gradually increased over time. 
In relation to the first theme, ‘Top management and human resource policy and procedures’ 
consisted of 10 items, over all the years there were 2531 annual report and CSR disclosures. 
The most frequent disclosure item was  (1) The company has a Code of Conduct, equivalent 
policy document or value statement that includes an explicit statement of the no-bribes policy 
(the combined disclosures for the period was 433: within annual reports, 21 companies 
disclosed this item in 2009 and 66 in 2012; and within the CSR reports 48 companies disclosed 
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the item in 2009 and the number went up to 82 in 2012). The least disclosed item within the 
first category was (10) Amount of expenditure on employee training in regards to anti-bribery 
(the combined disclosures for the period was only 11: 1 company disclosed this in 2009 and 4 
in 2012 within the annual report and no company disclosed in 2009 and 2 in 2012 within the 
CSR report).  
 
The second disclosure theme or category ‘Risk assessment’ consisted of four items. For the 
overall years, there were 1623 annual report and CSR disclosures. The most disclosed item 
within this category was (11) The board or equivalent body has oversight of the risk assessment 
process for bribery in the organisation (the combined disclosure for the overall period was 
601: within the annual reports 74 companies for this item in 2009 and 94 companies in 2012; 
within CSR reports 51 companies disclosed this item in 2009 and the number went up to 81 in 
2012) and the lowest disclosing item was  (13) Number of times the risk assessment process is 
carried out in a year (the combined number of disclosures was only 160: 7 companies disclosed 
via an annual report in 2009 and the number increased to 53 companies in 2012; 3 companies 








Number of Companies that made Disclosures  
2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
number of 





and procedures  
1. The company has a Code of Conduct, equivalent policy document or value statement that includes an 
explicit statement of the no-bribes policy 
21 48 24 55 57 80 66 82 433 
2. There is a policy that  the company is  consistent with all relevant anti-bribery laws in all jurisdictions in 
which the company transacts it business 21 44 23 51 51 76 64 80 410 
3. Reference to key individuals and departments involved in the development and implementation of the 
organisation’s prevention procedures on bribery of foreign officials 10 21 14 31 42 63 58 71 310 
4. Employees are required to read and annually sign that they have read and agree to the company’s anti-
bribery programme and business conduct guidelines 3 4 5 6 14 22 18 29 101 
5. There are policies and procedures for continuing appropriate training of directors, managers, employees, 
agents and other intermediaries so that they clearly understand the company’s anti-bribery programme, know 
the company’s expectations and the sanctions procedures in the event of a violation 
22 35 35 45 60 64 68 76 405 
6. There are policies and procedures to make clear through communications that no employee will suffer 
demotion, penalty, or other adverse consequences for refusing to pay bribes even if such refusal may result in 
the company losing business 
10 18 17 33 42 60 54 70 304 
7. The company assesses training activities on the programme periodically for effectiveness in curbing bribery 
23 23 30 31 57 59 63 76 362 
8. Number of employees being trained 1 0 8 8 38 28 49 40 172 
9. Number of employees terminated for bribery-related reasons 1 0 2 0 6 4 6 4 23 
10. Amount of expenditure on employee training in regards to anti-bribery 1 0 1 0 2 1 4 2 11 
Total disclosures   113 193 159 260 369 457 450 530 2531 
 Risk Assessment  11. The board or equivalent body has oversight of the risk assessment process for bribery in the organisation 74 51 79 59 88 75 94 81 601 
12. The risk assessment process identifies and prioritises risks from bribery (e.g. country risks, sectoral risks) 70 38 78 46 90 60 89 72 543 
13. Number of times the risk assessment process is carried out in a year 7 3 14 7 35 15 53 26 160 
14. Detailed policies and procedures are developed and improved based on the risks identified in which they 
are benchmarked against universal business principles for countering bribery (E.g. reference to Transparency 
International, OECD, or UK Bribery Act 2010)                      
3 3 14 11 75 60 81 72 319 
Total disclosures 
 
154 95 185 123 288 210 317 251 1623 
Due Diligence 
Measures to curb 
different nature 
15. There is a procedure to record accurately in the books any facilitation payments made 
2 21 2 30 7 41 13 46 162 
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of bribery of 
foreign public 
officials  
16. There are procedures and controls, including thresholds and reporting procedures, to ensure that the 
company’s policies relating to gifts, hospitality and expenses are followed and conform to the anti-corruption 
laws of the countries where they are made or received 
6 33 7 46 12 62 19 70 255 
17. Monetary amount of political contributions 48 4 50 4 53 6 53 6 224 
18. Contributions are subjected to procedures and controls to ensure they are not used as a subterfuge for 
bribery to gain the undue advantage for the company 
25 43 29 49 44 64 50 68 372 
19. There is a procedure for due diligence to be carried out on recipient bodies so that no foreign public official 
is associated with the body that will gain an advantage in the conduct of business 
21 33 29 40 47 60 53 65 348 
20. Monetary amount of social/charitable contributions 66 4 68 5 70 7 70 16 306 
21. There are procedures for the approval and payment of sponsorships to ensure payments are in line with the 
normal purchasing procedures and associated with corrupt practices 
15 21 19 34 29 53 33 58 262 
22. A list of sponsorships made is published publicly to ensure transparency in alignment with the 
organisation’s anti-bribery programme 
18 15 21 25 36 36 37 47 235 
23. Monetary amount given for sponsorships 27 5 27 6 26 17 29 19 156 
24. The company has policy and procedures to make known its anti-bribery programme to contractors, 
subcontractors and suppliers 
22 26 23 41 40 67 48 70 337 
25. The company measures the training given to contractors and suppliers 18 21 26 38 50 61 54 64 332 






26. External consultants are used to monitor, advise and assure the organisation’s anti-bribery programme 90 48 93 56 97 71 98 74 627 
27. An external verification or assurance has been conducted 94 6 95 5 97 9 97 9 412 
28. Internal auditors are used to monitor and advise on the organisation’s anti-bribery programme 78 23 86 31 86 64 98 64 530 
29. Number of members in the audit committee who have oversight over ethical matters such as bribery and 
corruption 12 3 19 8 57 34 73 52 258 
30. The company provides secure and accessible channels through which employees can raise concerns and 
report violations (‘whistleblowing’) in confidence and without risk of reprisal 
39 29 42 31 52 46 58 47 344 
31. There is a procedure to implement accountability throughout the company and its subsidiaries to enforce 
internal controls and proper books and records in relation to transactions with foreign public officials 22 43 24 58 42 47 60 76 372 
32. There are procedures to ensure that there are no ‘off-the-books’ accounts, inadequately defined transactions 
or false entries 
7 6 8 12 23 23 28 31 138 
33. The internal controls include financial and organisational checks and balances over the company’s 
accounting and record-keeping practices and other business processes related to the anti-bribery programme 78 33 79 55 84 69 90 72 560 
34. There is an audit committee that provides oversight of internal controls, financial reporting processes and 
related functions including countering bribery 
66 22 74 30 84 55 91 67 489 
35. There is a procedure for reporting bribery of foreign officials-related incidents to the authorities 30 10 33 22 44 35 50 39 263 
36. The company publishes publicly details of public legal cases of bribery of foreign officials involving the 
company 
5 4 3 8 5 18 8 24 75 
37. Number of incidents in relation to bribery of foreign officials  7 1 4 3 6 3 5 7 36 
38. The company monitors its significant investments periodically to check that their anti-bribery programmes 
are adequate and working 
13 14 17 23 33 35 38 37 210 
Total disclosures   541 242 577 342 710 509 794 599 4314 





Table 3: Summary of changes (increases) in the number of disclosures on curbing bribery over time (n=99) 
Disclosure categories  
Changes in 2009-2010 Changes in 2010-2011 Changes in 2011-2012 Cumulative changes       
2009-2012 
AR CSR AR CSR AR CSR AR CSR 
Top management and human resource policy and procedures 46 67 210 197 81 73 337 337 
 Risk Assessment 31 28 103 87 29 41 163 156 
 Due Diligence Measures to curb different nature of bribery of foreign public officials 33 92 113 156 45 55 191 303 
Monitoring and Review of Bribery of foreign public officials 36 100 133 167 84 90 253 357 











Eleven items were considered within the third category ‘Due diligence measures to curb 
different nature of bribery of foreign public officials’ consisting of 2989 disclosures for the 
overall period. The most disclosed item under this category within the annual report was (18) 
Contributions are subjected to procedures and controls to ensure they are not used as a 
subterfuge for bribery to gain the undue advantage for the company (the combined disclosures 
was 372: within the annual reports, 25 companies disclosed this item in 2009 and the number 
went up to 50 in 2012 and within the CSR report 43 companies disclosed this item in 2009 and 
the number rose to 68 in 2012). The least disclosed item was (23) Monetary amount given for 
sponsorships (the combined disclosures for the whole period was 156: within annual reports, 
27 companies disclosed this item in 2009 and the number marginally increased to 29 in 2012; 
within CSR reports, 5 companies disclosed in 2009 and 19 in 2012).  
 
We looked at 13 items within the category ‘Monitoring and review of bribery of foreign public 
officials’ and found 4314 disclosures for the overall period— the highest number of disclosures 
for a category throughout the period of observation.  The most specific disclosed item with this 
category was (26) External consultants are used to monitor, advise and assure the 
organisation’s anti-bribery programme (the total disclosure for the period is 627— the highest 
number of disclosures for a specific item out of 38 specific items for this study: within annual 
report 90 companies disclosed in 2009 and the number had risen to 98 in 2012; within the CSR 
reports 48 companies disclosed this item in 2009 and the number rose to 74 in 2012). The least 
disclosed item was (37) Number of incidents in relation to bribery of foreign officials  (total 
number of disclosures was only 36— 7 companies disclosed this item in 2009 and the number 
went down to 5 in 2012 within the annual reports and within the CSR reports 1 company 
disclosed this item in 2009 and  7 companies in 2012)8.  
 
As shown in Table 2 in total, there was an increasing trend in annual report disclosures (1076 
disclosures in 2009 and the number went up to 2020 disclosures in 2012) and in CSR 
disclosures (756 disclosures in 2009 and the number went up to 1909 in 2012). Table 3 shows 
the changes in disclosures more clearly. As Table 3 shows, the increase in disclosures of all 
four categories reached a peak during 2010-2011. Total disclosures on Top management and 
human resource policy and procedures within the annual reports increased by 46 in the first 
year (2009-2010), 210 in the second year (2010-2011) and then increased further by 81 in the 
third year (2011-2012). Within the CSR reports, disclosures under the same category rose by 
67 in 2009-2010,  197 in 2010-2011 and then 73 in 2011-2012. A similar pattern of changes 
can also be observed in the other 3 categories of disclosures. However, the cumulative change 
in disclosures on top management and human resource policy and procedures were higher than 
the other three categories within both annual reports and CSR reports.  
 
8 We analysed disclosures on bribery incidents and media reports on bribery incident independently. Our findings 
shed light on the relation between the least disclosed items by the sample companies and the media allegations of 
bribery incidents they were involved in. We found that corporate disclosures on the incidents of bribery of foreign 
officials were related to the media allegations of bribery incidents. The next phase of analysis was conducted to 
understand the relationship between bribery disclosures and media report.  
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Furthermore, to understand which general themes significantly changed between the pre and 
post-UK Bribery Act, we ran an independent samples t-test9. An independent samples t-test 
was conducted to compare the average number of disclosures companies for each category 
before enforcement of the UK Bribery Act (2009 and 2010) (n = 99 companies for annual 
reports; n = 91 companies for CSR reports) to the average disclosure companies after the 
enforcement of the UK Bribery Act (2011 and 2012). As shown in Table 4, considering annual 
report disclosures, two categories (‘Top management and human resource policy and 
procedures’; p= .000 and ‘Due Diligence Measures to curb different nature of bribery of foreign 
public officials’; p=.013) out of four observed significant (p=.000) increases in the number of 
disclosures from before to after enactment of the Bribery Act. Considering the stand-alone CSR 
report, all four categories (Top management and human resource policy and procedures, p= 
.002; Risk Assessment, p=.023; ‘Due Diligence Measures to curb different nature of bribery of 
foreign public officials’, p=.001 and ‘Monitoring and Review of Bribery of foreign public 
officials’, p=.000) showed a significant increase in disclosures. Furthermore, two categories 
‘Top management and human resource policy and procedures’ [annual reports (t = -4.73; p 
=.000); CSR reports (t = -3.34; p=.002)] and Risk Assessment [annual reports (t = -1.656; p = 
.123); CSR reports (t = -2.545; p = .023)] observed the highest mean difference.  
While there was a general upward trend in the number of disclosures from before to after the 
enactment of the Bribery Act, there was a variation among specific issues disclosed by the 
companies. Out of 38 specific items, companies were most keen to disclose 21 items and 
reluctant to disclose at least 17 items.10  The three items (out of 38) companies were most 
reluctant to disclose (10) Amount of expenditure on employee training in regards to anti-
bribery (with only 11 disclosures in total during the observation period), (9) Number of 
employees terminated for bribery-related reasons (with 23 disclosures in total) and (37) 
Number of incidents in relation to bribery of foreign officials (with 36 disclosures in total). The 
least disclosed items mostly related to the factual data/information. In other words, Table 2 
suggests that companies provided more disclosures on the general measures they undertook to 
prevent bribery incidents, whereas their disclosures on specific actions against bribery-related 
incidents are very limited. The low disclosure of factual information (such as the number of 
bribery incidents) is a problematic aspect of disclosures, and in the advance section, we will,  
in particular, provide critical illustrations of how companies disclose incidents of bribery of 







9 The independent t-test is considered appropriate as the dataset meets all independent t-test assumptions (i.e., 
scale of measurement, independence, normality and homogeneity of variance). 
10 Companies were reluctant to disclose item numbers 4, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 29, 32, 35, 36, 37 
and 38.  
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Table 4: Results of t-tests of mean difference of disclosures on curbing bribery: before 
and after the enactment of the UK Bribery Act    
  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean t-Stat. Sig. 
  Before After Before After Difference    
  Annual Reports (n=99) 
Top management and human 
resource policy and 
procedures 
 14  41  10.81  23.48 -27.35 -4.73 .000* 
Risk  Assessment   42  67  35.42  23.86 -25 -1.656 .123 
Due Diligence Measures to 
curb different nature of 
bribery of foreign public 
officials 
 26  40  17.90  17.44 -13.81 -2.593 .013* 
Monitoring and Review of 
Bribery of foreign public 
officials 
43  53  34.45 31.92 -10.21 -1.075 .287 
  CSR Reports (n=91) 
Top management and human 
resource policy and 
procedures 
 23 49 19.57 29.89 -26.7 -3.34 .002* 
Risk Assessment 27 58 23.57 24.17 -30.38 -2.545 .023* 
Due Diligence Measures to 
curb different nature of 
bribery of foreign public 
officials 
 24 46 15.207 23.17  -20.86 -3.53 .001* 
Monitoring and Review of 
Bribery of foreign public 
officials 
23 45 17.93 22.63 -22.76 -3.92 .000* 
*p < 0.05 
In summary, we find that companies were responsive to the Bribery Act as coercive pressures 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995) and at the same time, we argue the fewer disclosures 
on some specific issues (such as bribery incidents) appears consistent with the notion of 
decoupling (Lepoutre & Valente, 2012; Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2012; Sandholtz, 2012).  
Accordingly, in the next section, by considering a specific disclosure item (this being disclosure 
of bribery incidents) we present a problematic aspect of companies’ response to the UK Bribery 
Act.   
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5.2 Bribery Incidents and Disclosures: Degree of decoupling and logic of institutional 
non-conformity 
Prior social accounting literature suggests that social disclosures can serve as a symbolic carrier 
or be used to maintain symbolic legitimacy (i.e. institutional logics of symbolic adoption or 
malignant separation) when organisations face broader stakeholder pressures (Killian & 
O’Regan, 2016; Archel, Husillos & Spence, 2011). More critically, when social disclosures or 
social auditing serve as a symbolic legitimacy, they may perpetuate social inequality (Islam, 
Deegan, & Gray, 2018; Semeen & Islam, 2020;  Chwastiak & Young, 2003; Neu, Cooper, & 
Everett, 2001; and they may do more harm than good (Puxty, 1986, 1991). In view of this, the 
notions of symbolic adoption or malignant separation are particularly relevant in the context of 
our study to problematise anti-bribery disclosure patterns when companies face bribery 
allegations. Accordingly, in this section, we present an analysis of news media reports on 
particular bribery incidents and the responses to those reports by the companies concerned, to 
gain insights into whether and how (via the strategies of symbolic adoption or malignant 
separation) the companies’ disclosures reflect a perceived immunity to the UK Bribery Act’s 
requirements.  
 
Table 5:  Incidents of bribery of foreign officials in news media and corporate 
disclosures  on those incidents after the emergence of the UK Bribery Act 
 
As can be seen in Table 5, media attention towards allegations, prosecutions or settlements of 
corporate bribery of foreign public officials by UK corporations was dominated by Mining, 
Media attention to incidents of bribery of foreign officials 
by MNCs  







































159 3 3 2 1 2 1 
Other 134 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Pharmaceutical & 
Medical Care 
66 2 4 2 0 2 0 
Financials 45 2 5 0 2 0 3 
General Retailers 23 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Total 666 17 19 9 8 9 10 
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Telecommunications and ‘Other’ industries after the emergence of the UK Bribery Act. The 
number of articles dedicated to bribery of foreign officials related incidents, released after the 
implementation of the UK Bribery Act was 239 for the Mining, Utilities and Construction 
industries (rank 1);159 for the Telecommunications and Equipment industry (rank 2); and 134 
for the ‘Other’  industry (rank 3) (Table, 5).  
The Mining industry indeed deserved the most media attention due to it having recorded the 
greatest number of separate incidents (seven incidents for six companies). The number of 
separate bribery incidents per industry was then highest for the Pharmaceutical & Medical Care 
industry (four incidents for two companies), and for the Financials industry (five incidents for 
two companies). The two pharmaceutical companies, both made disclosures for the two 
incidents that had been documented, whilst companies under the Financials industry made no 
disclosures concerning reported incidents.  
In the three industries generating the most media attention: in the Mining industry, three out of 
six alleged bribery guilty companies made disclosures; in Telecommunications two out of three 
alleged bribery guilty companies made disclosures, and in the other industry one out of two 
alleged bribery guilty companies made disclosures. Whether such disclosures were reflective 
of real-life allegations and incidents of bribery, reported by the news media, was of significant 
interest. Such information will help address whether and to what degree decoupling may be 
observed. Interestingly, only 10 out of 17 companies made disclosures, and only 3 of them 
disclosed corrective actions (i.e., companies’ admitted bribery incidents and made disclosures 
about recovery measures) on the particular incidents that received media attention.  
Given the above discussion on media attention on bribery incidents and related corporate 
disclosures during the UK Bribery Act (2011-2012), the extent of decoupling during both post 
and pre-regulatory periods is presented next. We compared the extent of decoupling between 
post and pre UK Bribery Act periods to understand whether the Act was effective in reducing 
companies’ decoupling behaviour. To understand the level of decoupling, we assessed the 
extent to which the particular companies (see Appendix B) disclosed bribery incidents as 
highlighted by news media11.  In other words, we examined the extent of companies’ disclosure 
by applying the three levels of decoupling introduced in section 3 - malignant separation, 
symbolic adoption and complete implementation (Sandholtz, 2012; Buhr, 2001; Jamali, 2010; 
Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2012).  
 
In relation to post period of the Act (2011-2012), as shown in Table 6 and documented in 
Appendix B, out of the 17 companies alleged to have bribed foreign officials (Table 6), 7 
companies did not disclose the bribery incident (i.e. these companies adopted a full decoupling 
or malignant separation strategy), 8companies disclosed generic information about the incident 
(i.e. these companies adopted a slight decoupling or symbolic adoption strategy), and only 2 
companies fully disclosed detailed information about the incident (i.e. these companies adopted 
 
11 Comparing news media articles on bribery incidents with corporate disclosures on those incidents is consistent 





no decoupling or a complete implementation strategy). We examined both the year that the 
incident was reported and the following year so media and reporting time lags were controlled. 
Table 6, indicates that after the enactment of the UK Bribery Act, considerably more companies 
are fully decoupling their disclosures from real events, as opposed to fully adopting regulators’ 
call for higher transparency. Such finding suggests that the UK Bribery Act did not contribute 
to the reduction of corporate decoupling about curbing bribery of foreign officials by UK based 
MNCs. This finding, accordingly, motivated us to examine how these companies disclosed 
bribery incidents in a fully unregulated environment or during the pre-period of the Act (2007-
2009). 
 
Table 6: Companies Classified in Three Degrees of Decoupling: strategy, nature and 
companies (pre and post-enactment periods of UK bribery act)  
Degree of 
Decoupling 





Full Decoupling Malignant Separation Non-disclosure, separation C  (Both incidents) 
D   
E (Second incident) 






H (Both incidents) 
P 
Slight Decoupling Symbolic Adoption Ceremonial, Ritualistic, 
Generic. Present but not 
substantial 
A  











No Decoupling Complete 
Implementation 








In relation to the period before the Act (2007-2009), as documented in Appendix B and Table 
6, out of the 6 companies alleged with bribery of foreign officials, 3 (A, H and P; for one of 
which two incidents were alleged) did not disclose the bribery incident (i.e. these companies 
adopted Full decoupling or Malignant Separation strategy), 3 (B, O and Q) disclosed generic 
information in relation to the incident (i.e. these companies adopted Slight decoupling or 
Symbolic adoption strategy), and no company fully disclosed detailed information with regard 
to the incident. Hence, we found the same or similar pattern of responses by companies when 
we looked at corporate decoupling behaviour before the enactment of the UK Bribery Act. 
In analysing the movement of the same six companies (A, H, P; B, O and Q) between pre-Act 
(2007-2009) and the post-Act (2011-12) period, we found that company A and company P 
moved from full decoupling to slight decoupling.  Company B moved from slight decoupling 
to no decoupling.  Company O and company Q were slight decouplers for both periods. 
Company H, a bank, was a full decoupler in both periods. The movement mostly in between 
full decoupling and slight decoupling indicates that the Act has had a limited effect on corporate 
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decoupling behaviour. Our overall findings suggest that the regulation (or coercive pressure) 
like the UK Bribery Act was less useful to eliminate perpetuating of corporate decoupling in 
relation to curbing bribery.  
And hence, while we find anti-bribery disclosures increased significantly after the enactment 
of the UK bribery act (see previous section, 5.1), these disclosures do not reflect real bribery 
incidents. The disclosures provide a symbolic carrier of the institutional requirements of the 
UK Bribery Act. Our findings are consistent with the view that, in the presence of institutional 
contradictions, companies appear to adopt decoupling strategies (Fiss & Zajac, 2004) which 
seek immunity from an institutional requirement and maximise self-interest (Lepoutre & 
Valente, 2012; George et al., 2006). Such insights add to the existing critical research (Semeen 
& Islam, 2020; Gray, 2010) that corporate disclosures are more aligned with symbolism than 
reflecting any real improvement in relation to their accountabilities to broader stakeholder 
groups.  
 
The above findings raise a few valid and interesting questions: Do news media report actual 
incidents/cases of bribery? What sources do news media usually use when reporting particular 
incidents of bribery? How do the concerned companies change their response/disclosure 
strategies in response to subsequent coverage by news media of particular incidents of bribery? 
How does the broader community learn that particular cases of bribery have been resolved or 
dismissed? Once we attempt to outline the problems that bribery disclosures and corporate 
decoupling strategies present, the potential range of questions like these remains relevant. We 
explore a few of these questions further in Table 7.  
 Following on from our main findings (Table 6), we have attempted to review and track how 
companies disclosed particular bribery cases after initial reports and until the news media 
stopped reporting the cases. We reviewed subsequent and final news media reports on bribery 
incidents more precisely and found that journalists tended to use factual information drawn 
from sources ranging from government departments, via prosecutors and SEC authorities, to a 
whistle-blower. At the same time, we reviewed the annual reports of the companies concerned 
just after the final media reports on the cases and found companies’ initial decoupling strategies 
did not change much. A summary of these finding is presented in Table 7.   
As we can see in Table 7, over time the companies changed their strategies on the bribery 
incidents reported by news media little or not at all. To track whether any of the incidents 
considered for this study resulted in criminal prosecutions under any law (this is particularly 
relevant when examining instances of companies’ malignant decoupling from situations), we 
looked at subsequent and final media reports on the cases and companies’ disclosures after the 
media reports. We have found that all 7 companies that adopted a malignant (or full) decoupling 
strategy early (Table 6) maintained the same strategy subsequently: The companies did not 
disclose any information in response to final media reports on prosecutions and penalties. This 
surprised us most, because companies are supposed to disclose prosecutions or potential 
obligations and liabilities, at least as contingent liabilities within their annual reports. Out of 
eight companies that adopted symbolic or slight decoupling strategy, 7 of them maintained the 
same strategy subsequently and one moved from slight decoupling to no decoupling. Two 
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companies that adopted a no-coupling strategy early (see Table 6) maintained the same strategy 
by disclosing information (in their annual reports) about subsequent prosecutions and the 
payment of penalties for bribery imposed upon them by courts, as reported in the final news 
media articles. Most of the cases involving companies that sustained full and slight decoupling 
strategies led to prosecutions, and we learned of these from media articles and not from their 
annual reports. This is problematic because these companies were not prepared to even mention 
the overseas bribery cases in their annual reports, to formally let shareholders know what had 
actually happened, and even though some cases were very substantial (a few companies were 
fined more than US$300 million each for bribery). 
Table 7: Studied companies’ disclosures of bribery cases  after subsequent and final 
media reporting of the cases (study period: after enactment of the UK Bribery Act) 
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N (No disclosure)  
 
M (No disclosure) 
 
 
H (No disclosure) 
C (Media reported that a whistle-blower was a key source in 
one case. Eventually, a lawyer was engaged by the company to 
deal with both cases and finally, the company was fined by the 
court for both cases. No disclosure by C so far.)   
 
D (Media reported that a local investigator looked into the 
case. No disclosure by D.) 
 
E (Media reported that US federal police were involved in the 
case. In 2015 US SEC imposed a civil penalty for the bribery: 
US$00 (two digits) million. No disclosure by E) 
 
F (Media reported that an accounting firm (not Big 4) was 
involved as a consultant for F. Cases taken to court but result 
not known. F has not disclosed this case at all so far.) 
 
N (Media report continued until 2017. No disclosure by N.) 
 
M (Media reported that the prosecutor told the court that s/he 
found corruption on a massive scale. No disclosure by M ) 
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L (No change in 
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A (Court fined A; reported by media; no disclosure by A.) 
 
E (Media reported the SEC along with an accounting firm (Big 
4) participating in the investigation. No specific disclosures in 
E’s annual reports so far.) 
  
I (Media reported court case filing. No new update in I’s 
annual report so far.) 
 
K (Media reported an independent law firm investigating but 
no report on the result of an investigation. No specific 
disclosure in  K’s annual reports.) 
 
O (Media reported the case continuing in 2020. No disclosure 
in O’s annual report.) 
 
L (Media reported the court settled the case for a fine of £000 





















Q (Media reported a court settlement and Q paying penalty of  
£00 (two digits) million.  No specific disclosure in Q’s annual 
report.) 
P (Media reported court fined P  US $000 (3 digits) million. P 


























G (Disclosed fine 
payment) 
 
B (Media reported the third party appointed and penalty paid 
as per court order. B disclosed this in its annual report.) 
 
 
G (Media reported that an internal auditor and US SEC were 
involved in the case settlement.  US$00 (two digits) million 
paid as a penalty and disclosed in G’s annual report.) 
 
In our review of final media articles and corporate disclosures on the specific bribery cases, we 
found that independent consultants, lawyers and even accounting firms (including Big 4 firms) 
have been engaged in settling bribery cases. All of these actors were engaged to protect 
companies from the risk of higher penalty for bribery, rather than to protect broader community 
interests.   
In our extended review of news media and corporate reporting, we have found that most of the 
UK-based companies that were fined by US courts for bribery were cross-listed on US stock 
exchanges and subject to the FCPA. We have found that the companies studied adopted limited 
disclosures of the direct implications of the UK Bribery Act as a part of their response to the 
final media coverage of the bribery incidents. These findings are consistent with broader 
concerns over the lack of regulatory enforcement as reported in the early OECD report for the 
UK (OECD’s third phase of evaluation for the UK, OECD, 2012). The UK received sharp 
criticism from the OECD over its failure to enforce the UK Bribery Act. Reasons for 
unsuccessful enforcement of the UK Bribery Act were various but often narrowed down to 
insufficient resources, delay in processing cases and inadequate complaints mechanisms and 
protection for whistle-blowers (OECD, 2012). The staff of the authorities involved appeared 
to lack an understanding of the foreign bribery offence (TI, 2014; OECD, 2012). The lack of 
enforcement also means that there is uncertainty over compliance with the act (Taddia, 2014).  
In line with Lepoutre and Valente’s (2012) argument, our findings indicate that when 
companies were subject to bribery incidents, most failed to disclose this and conform with the 
UK Bribery Act – this, in turn, suggests that companies developed a form of immunity (or low 
sensitivity) to the requirements of the Act. While such nature of absence or silence in bribery 
reporting creates a kind of immunity for corporations given the existence of regulatory 
ambiguities and/or dual environmental complexities in the institutional field (Seo & Creed, 
2002), this does state that the silence in reporting in many instances perpetuates injustice and 
inequality to underprivileged stakeholders (Chwastiak & Young, 2003; Young, 2003) 
including victims in developing nations where the concerned companies operate. This was well 
understood by triangulation of the above analysis of media (Table 6, 7, and Appendix B) and 
corporate narratives with OECD’s country analysis based on facts and experts’ opinions. In 
fact, our triangulation via corporate reports, media news, and OECD’s report on the UK 
(OECD, 2012) indicate that enactment of the UK Bribery Act did not reduce corporate 
decoupling, and that failed implementation has induced companies to feel immune from its 
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provisions, so has appeared to perpetuate injustice to the people of less privileged countries in 
which bribery incidents have occurred.  
 
6. Concluding remarks  
Given the status of the UK Bribery Act, as well as external stakeholder interests, in the fight 
against bribery of foreign officials by MNCs, the objectives of this study were (1) to understand 
whether and how the largest 100 UK-based MNCs’ disclosures or narratives on curbing bribery 
changed from 2009 to 2012 in response to the enactment of the UK Bribery Act 2010 and (2) 
to investigate whether and how such disclosures changed substantively to reflect real 
allegations, incidents or events relating to bribery of foreign officials mostly based in 
underprivileged and developing nations. This study enables us to envisage whether and how 
decoupling occurred in the presence of coercive pressures. Results of this study in relation to 
the first objective show that the UK Bribery Act, as coercive pressure, significantly influenced 
corporations’ disclosure behaviour. Such influence was observed for all companies subject to 
the Act. Thus, our findings are consistent with the institutional notion of coercive pressure 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, Scott, 1995) and support the view (Sandholtz, 2012; Heese et al., 
2016) that the organisations adopt disclosure strategies in an attempt to respond to the external 
regulatory environments.  
By way of different notions of institutional decoupling (Lepoutre & Valente, 2012; Helms et 
al., 2012; Jamali, 2010; Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2012, Sandholtz, 2012) and based on the 
thematic analysis of news media articles focussing on incidents of bribery of foreign officials 
by 17 companies and the disclosures on these incidents within the annual reports of the 
companies concerned, the results concerning the second objective show that in general, 
companies’ disclosures were not substantively or materially reflective of real allegations or 
incidents of bribery of foreign officials. Since the purpose of the UK Bribery Act was to prevent 
corporations from bribing in cross-border transactions, it was expected that the number of 
companies decoupling their disclosures from the action, would be less than the number of 
companies not decoupling their disclosures from the action and making full disclosure of 
bribery of foreign officials. The results, however, show that this was not the case. That is, in 
the majority of the cases under investigations, the concerned companies remained symbolic 
and silent in reporting or clarification on the alleged bribery incidents. Such symbolic and silent 
strategy could do more harm than good (Puxty, 1991) and perpetuate injustice and inequality 
to underprivileged stakeholders (Chwastiak & Young, 2003; Young, 2003) including those that 
were based in developing nations where the concerned companies operated. Decoupling and 
non-conformity occurred despite the UK government’s attempt to clarify the regulatory 
requirements through the Bribery Act.  
As seen in this paper, the problematic angle of the notion of coercive pressure is that a 
regulation can be a formal structure with incentives for symbolic compliance (Zbaracki, 1998; 
Sandholtz, 2012; Lepoutre & Valente, 2012) allowing corporations to find immunity from the 
regulatory requirements and perpetuate injustices. Regulators should think about why new or 
more regulations without substantive requirement are not helpful to curb corporate decoupling 
and injustice. The regulators should address the crisis that MNCs being suppliers of bribery is 
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much more harmful to the underprivileged communities in developing nations. Accordingly, 
this paper provides practical insights into how stakeholders ought to interpret MNCs’ accounts 
of their involvement in bribery critically.  The issue of bribery of foreign officials deserves 
further research attention.  
The investigation into whether disclosures on curbing bribery of foreign officials were 
decoupled from real-life allegations of bribery is arguably at the heart of this paper, and it is 
what differentiates this study from others that examined corporations’ reporting behaviour in 
response to regulation.  Given that, we acknowledge a limitation on the use of media reports 
focussing on the incidents/allegations of bribery in identifying the actual number of bribery 
incidents. As some bribery incidents identified from news media reports appeared to be 
allegations, not convictions for bribery within the period of this study, companies could have 
defensible reasons for not disclosing some contingencies. In relation to any particular media 
report/s on the incidents, during the period of this study, we were unaware whether any 
reporters (investigative journalists) were (legally) challenged by the concerned companies. 
Identifying a bribery incident is a challenging task and given that we encourage future research 
to use alternative sources of data to examine corporate accountability in relation to the 
elimination of bribery. We also encourage future research to evaluate how the UK Bribery Act 
has an effect on corporate accountability by considering what the optimal time lag might be 
between news media highlighting particular bribery incidents, NGOs’ anti-bribery activism 
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As detailed by the Ministry of Justice (2011), the six principles may be summarized as follows: 
 
(1) Proportionate Procedures: Procedures that are put in place only have to be proportionate to the 
size and nature of the business. Modest risks require modest procedures.  
(2) Top-Level Commitment: Top-level management are committed to preventing bribery by 
persons within the organizations. They foster a culture within the organisations in which bribery 
is never acceptable.  
(3) Risk Assessment: The organisation assesses the nature and extent of its exposure to potential 
external and internal risks of bribery on its behalf or by persons associated with it. The 
assessment is periodic, informed and documented.  
(4) Due Diligence: The organisation applies due diligence procedures in respect of persons who 
perform services for or on behalf of the organisation, in order to mitigate identified bribery risks.  
(5) Communication: The organisation seeks to ensure that its bribery prevention policies and 
procedures are embedded and understood throughout the organisation through internal and 
external communication, including training.  
(6) Monitoring and Review: The organisation monitors and reviews procedures designed to 







Appendix B:  Summary of Bribery Related Incidents in News Media and Corresponding 
Annual Report Disclosures before and soon after the enactment of the UK bribery act 
(2007-2012) 
 
Company Year Country(ies) 
involved 
Incident and Key 
Allegations 
Disclosures within the 
concerned company  
annual  reports 




















Qatar, South Africa, 
Tanzania and the 




The company failed to keep 
adequate accounting records 
related to materially 
substantial commission 
payments made to overseas 
agents in assisting the 
company in obtaining 
contracts from the Tanzanian 
government to buy a radar 





Company A was accused of 
bribing and offering 
sweeteners to the senior public 
officials in different countries 
in return for lucrative arms 
contract.  [The Guardian, 
2008].                                                                                           
[Dow Jones International 
News, 2007] 
 In its 2011 Annual report, 
company A did not directly 
acknowledge what commission 
was paid to overseas agents for 
the radar contract. However, it 
was noted that a £29.5m 
charitable contribution to 
benefit the Tanzanian people, in 
connection with a global 
settlement of regulatory 
investigations by the UK's 
Serious Fraud Office, was 
deducted from the Group's net 
debt as at 31 December 2010. 
 
 
There was no disclosure about 
incidents in 2008 and partial 
disclosure in 2007 mentioning 
only the Saudi Arabia incident 










Criminally indicted by Serbian 
authorities as part of a wider 
investigation into allegations 





Company B was accused of 
bribing an Iraqi to win 
lucrative contracts. The 
company had paid $162,000 
(GBP81, 000) in bribes to get 
three contracts worth $2.9m. 
[The Guardian, 2007] 
. 
In 2011 Annual report, 
company B disclosed details of 
the criminal indictment. The 
disclosure was detailed with the 
parties involved in the incident 
and the current status of the 
indictment. 
 
Partial disclosure was made 
mentioning the country 
involvement and potential fines 
involved in this allegation, but 
the company did not disclose 
the actual incident involved in 
it. 
 










They were investigated for 
providing $40million loan to 
Tanzania to buy a radar 
system. There are questions of 
what due diligence standards 
Company C carried out in 
relation to loan to Tanzania to 
be reassured that the funding 
would not facilitate a corrupt 
deal. The Financial Times 
 
Company C did not disclose any 
information relating to this 















Scrutinised for providing 
“multi-million euro loan to a 
Lebanese arms dealer, and 
politically exposed. The loan 
recommendation suggested 
that …would act as a business 
partner to Company C by 
helping the bank further its 
activities with Libyan foreign 
public officials. Media Part 
 
 No disclosures made on this 




2012 Aksai, Kazakhstan Company D’s joint ventures in 
Aksai, Kazakhstan went under 
investigation with allegations 
of bribery. A freight shipment 
handler received an 
anonymous email alleging 
improper facilitation payments 
for moving goods through 
Aksai’s customs office and 
bribe payments to Kazakh 
custom officials. The Wall 
Street Journal  
No disclosures of this incident  
within Company D’s  annual 
report (2011, 2012) 













 Alleged of making a $US1 
million payment to the 
Cambodian government in 
2006 to secure bauxite leases. 








Company E is under 
investigation by the Australian 
Federal Police over its 
sponsorship of the 2008 
Beijing Olympics as part of an 
ongoing U.S. Department of 
Justice investigation into 
possible violations of anti-
corruption laws. The 
investigation is related to 
alleged hospitality or gifts to 
foreign officials, including 
Chinese dignitaries. The 
Australian Financial Review, 
The Wall Street Journal 
 
 In the Annual Report 2012, 
company E disclosed 
information that it is continuing 
an internal investigation into 
allegations of “possible 
misconduct involving 
interactions with government 
officials” However no details on 
the involvement of government 
officials were disclosed.  
 
No disclosure on Beijing 
Olympic incident within the 
company E  annual reports 
(Annual reports, 2011, 2012 or 
website) 






West Asia  Company F conducted an 
internal investigation into 
allegations of bribery at its 
tanker chartering division. The 
allegations focus on the 
relationship between a senior 
employee and one of the 
company’s suppliers. Dow 
Jones International, The Daily 
Telegraph 
 
Company F  under 
investigation with UK Serious 
Fraud Office over bribery 
allegations relating to the 
engineering projects one of its 
 No disclosures were made in 
Company F annual reports of 
2010, 2011, and 2012 in relation 
to both incidents. 
37 
 
contractors is undertaking in 
West Asia, Dow Jones 




2011 South Korea, India 
and Thailand 
Company G’s employees or 
contractors paid bribes to 
government officials in South 
Korea, India and Thailand to 
boost sales and receive 
favourable tax treatment. The 
Financial Times 
Disclosure made in the 2011 
and 2012 annual report. The 
monetary settlement amount 
was disclosed but details of the 
incident were generic and not 
specific to the incident.  



















Taiwan   
 
Accused of funnelling £14m in 
alleged bribes paid by a British 
defence firm to Saudi Arabian 




Company H was alleged to 
accept and transfer $3.2m 
(pounds 2.3m) on behalf of the 
chief of staff to the former 
Antigua prime minister. The 
Guardian 
 
The company allegedly 
accepted US$60,000 from a 
Taiwanese client in June 2007 
to approve the applications of 
two companies. Dow Jones 
Chinese Financial Wire 
 
No disclosure made in 2007, 











I  2011 Chinese and South 
Korea 
The company I settled with 
regulators over allegations it 
bribed Chinese and South 
Korean officials to win at least 
$54 million in government 
contracts. National Post, New 
York Business Journal 
In the annual report 2011, there 
was a disclosure of the 
settlement, but it was not 
specific to the bribery of foreign 
officials.  
 
K   2012 China Company K faced allegations 
of bribery and corruption in 
making payments in return for 
a 2005 contract with Air China 
and a deal with China Eastern 
Airlines in 2010. The Sunday 
Times 
Detailed disclosure was given in 
financial notes to the contingent 
liability section of the annual 
report 2012. However, 
disclosure was not specific to 
this incident. The company only 
identified “matters of concern in 
these Indonesia and China and 
in other overseas markets.  
 














The Caribbean, the 
Middle East and 
Switzerland. 
Company L’s managers are 
alleged to have made payments 
to high-ranking individuals in 
the Gulf state's Energy and 
Water Ministry. The company 
received several contracts 
during 2010 from the Kuwaiti 





There was a bribery allegation 
against the Chairman and his 
successor  [The Sunday Times, 
2008] 
The disclosure was provided in 
the annual report 2011, and it 
mentioned it was involved in a 
project in Kuwait but did not 
mention it involved bribery (of 







The company did not disclose 
any real incidents and 







M   
 2012 Not mentioned A company executive received 
corrupt payments totalling 
£4.9million from directors of a 
major potato supplier in return 
for granting them a lucrative 
contract. Telegraph Online 
The incident remained 
undisclosed in 2011 and 2012 
annual and CSR reports.  
 
N    
 2012 Uganda  Company N denied allegations 
made in the Ugandan 
Parliament that it paid bribes to 
senior government ministers. 
The Irish Times.   
No disclosure was made in 
relation to the allegations in the 
2011 and 2012 annual reports.  














Settled allegations that they or 
their contractors bribed foreign 
officials to smooth the way for 
importing equipment and 
materials into several 






A U.K. court affidavit seen by 
the Financial Times says there 
is reasonable cause to believe 
Mr X bled money from his oil-
rich state and bought assets 
including a $20 million jet, 
houses in London and Dorset, 
and a EUR406,000 armour-
plated Mercedes-Benz from a 
Mayfair dealership. [Dow 
Jones International News,  
Financial Times, November 
2007] 
  
Generic disclosure was given 
and was not specific to bribery 
of foreign officials: “The 
Company O’s subsidiary agreed 
to a Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement…which arose in 
connection with its use of the 
freight-forwarding firm….” 
Annual report 2012 
 
 
Partial disclosure. Cases of 
bribery and fraud are reported to 
the Audit Committee of the 
Board. In 2007, 112 violations 
were reported. As a result, the 
company  ended its relationship 
with 151 staff and contractors  
















Allegedly paid Iranian public 
officers $60m and was given 
contracts to develop three 
separate oil and gas fields in 






The CEO and two other 
employees were being 
questioned by the French 
police investigating alleged 
corruption involving an Iran 
gas project [Dow Jones 
International News, 2007]. 
 
The disclosure was present, yet 
extremely generic and did not 
make reference to any oil and 
gas contracts: “employees were 
placed under formal criminal 
investigation for possible 
charges as accessories to the 
corruption of foreign public 
agents” Annual report 2012. 
 
No disclosure 








Company Q’s distributors paid 
bribes on behalf of the 
company's subsidiaries to 
Greek doctors in order to 
purchase the company’s 
products.  Dow Jones News 
Service 
 
Disclosure in the 2012 annual 
report was informative yet 
lacked substantiveness in 
relation to the Greek distributor 
scheme. The company’s 
disclosure instead focused on 
claims of commitment to 









Company Q has received a 
request from the Serious 
Fraud Office to hand over 
documents as part of an 
inquiry into bribes allegedly 
paid to the government in Iraq  
[The Daily Telegraph, 2007] 
 
 
 
No disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
